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STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN THE INTERESTS
OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE RIGHTS OF OLDER
WORKERS: THE AGE BFOQ DEFENSE
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)1 in an effort to curb arbitrary employment decisions based
on stereotypes and misconceptions concerning older workers.2 The
ADEA, as amended,3 prohibits employers, employment agencies, and
labor unions from making worker-related decisions solely on the basis of
age.' Enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC),5 the ADEA covers workers from the ages of forty to seventy6 in
both the private sector and state and local government.7
The purpose of the ADEA is similar to that of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.' Both statutes attempt to ensure that employers
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
See id. § 621(b); James & Alaimo, BFOQ: An Exception Becoming the Rule, 26
CLEVE. L. REV. 1, 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as James & Alaimo]; Comment, Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment-The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense-Balancing the
Interest of the Older Worker in Acquiring and Continuing Employment Against the Inter-
est in Public Safety, 24 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Balancing
the Interest]. In the preamble to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Con-
gress stated that one of the purposes of the ADEA was to prohibit arbitrary age dis-
crimination in employment. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b); see James & Alaimo, supra, at 1339 & 1340;
Balancing the Interest, supra, at 1.
See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-259, 88 Stat. 74; Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, §§ 1-7, 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
See 29 U.S.C. § 623. In regard to employer practices, the ADEA provides that an
employer cannot refuse to hire or discharge any individual because of age or classify
workers with respect to age when that classification will deprive the worker of employment
opportunities. 29 U.S.C. § 623. Section 623 also outlines similar provisions for employment
agencies and labor unions. Id. See generally Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The Age Discimination]
(thorough discussion of the ADEA of 1967).
' See Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 354 (Supp. II 1979) and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978). Originally, the Department of Labor
was the enforcing administrative agency for the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 625 (1975). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) now has responsibility for enforcement of
the Act. See Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978 Compilation).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631) (upper age limit changed from sixty-five to seventy).
7 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976) (ADEA applies to state and local government employees);
see Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1270 (4th Cir. 1977) (application of ADEA to government
workers constitutional); EEOC v. Wyoming, 50 U.S.L.W. 1103, 1104, (Jan. 12, 1982)
(Supreme Court considered constitutionality of ADEA's application to state governments in
their role as employers).
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-2000e-17 (1964). Congress enacted Title VII to promote employ-
ment decisions based on an individual's ability, rather than his or her race, sex, or religious
beliefs. Id. § 2000e-2. Similarly, Congress enacted the ADEA to ensure employment deci-
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base employment decisions on individual ability to perform the job,
rather than on the basis of irrelevant factors such as race, religion,
gender, and age.' Like Title VII, the ADEA also includes several excep-
tions to the blanket prohibition of discriminatory actions against
workers." An employer charged with discrimination based on age under
the ADEA either may deny the discrimination and offer another reason
for his employment decision," or he may admit to a per se violation of
the statute but offer a justification for the violation.12 If an employer
denies the allegation of age discrimination, he must show either that he
demoted or fired the employee for good cause," or that he based the
decision on a factor other than age." An employer, however, frequently
sions based on ability rather than age and to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination. 29 U.S.C.
§ 621(b); see Lorrillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). The ADEA and Title VII have im-
portant similarities in overall purpose and substantive provisions. Id.
Congress considered the idea of a federal law to ban age discrimination in 1964 in con-
nection with Title VII. Hearings on H.R. 405 before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm.
on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 38-39, 92, 430, 478-79 (1963); see Balancing
the Interest, supra note 2, at 1339. The legislative history of Title VII does not indicate why
Congress decided not to include age discrimination in Title VII. Balancing the Interest,
supra note 2, at 1339 n.3. Congress may have believed that substantive differences existed
between the factors underlying sex and race discrimination as opposed to age discrimina-
tion. Id. One commentator has suggested that age discrimination differs from race and sex
discrimination because of the element of the continuing effects of past discrimination in race
and sex cases. See The Age Discrimination, supra note 4, at 396. When a minority member
or a woman is refused a job, latent and unintentional discrimination may be present even if
the employer bases his decision on the individual's lack of skills. Id. The lack of skills in race
and sex cases may be the result of past discrimination in the area of education. Id. Older
workers as a group generally do not suffer from the effects of past discrimination. Id. at 397.
Federal studies conducted soon after the Civil Rights Act indicated, however, that age dis-
crimination had become a national problem even in the absence of past discrimination. See
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER -AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: RESEARCH MATERIALS 67-69 (1965). These studies led to the enactment
of the ADEA in 1967. See Balancing the Interest, supra note 2, at 1339 n.3.
See note 8 supra.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) (employer defenses under Title VII); text accompany-
ing notes 12-19 infra (employer defense under ADEA). Title VII has a counterpart to the
ADEA bona fide occupational qualification exception. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(e) (1970) (religion,
sex, or race may be grounds for discrimination if that characteristic is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification); see text accompanying notes 19-22 infra.
" See Player, Defenses Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Misinter-
pretation, Misdirection, and the 1978 Amendments, 12 GA. L. REV. 747, 749-50 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Player]. An employer charged with discrimination under the ADEA may
choose to deny that age was the basis of his employment decision. Id. The employer then
must show a valid reason other than age for his action under § 623(f) of ADEA. 29 U.S.C.
623(f); Player, supra, at 749-50. These nonage reasons for the employment action are not
true defenses to a charge of age discrimination because the employer does not admit the dis-
criminatory practice. Player, supra, at 750; cf. text accompanying notes 15-18 infra (defenses
under the ADEA).
12 See Player, supra note 11, at 749-50.
's 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1970); see note 11 supra.
" 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970); see note 11 supra.
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will choose to admit that he based his employment decision solely on age,
but will argue that one of the three defenses to age discrimination under
the ADEA excuses his action. 5 An employer may show that he based his
employment decision on a bona fide seniority system'" or on a bona fide
benefit plan of which age is an integral part. 7 Finally, the employer may
show that age is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the
job.
1 8
The most significant and most litigated of the three defenses to an
ADEA violation is that the challenged age policy is a BFOQ.19 To assert
the BFOQ exception, an employer must prove as an affirmative defense0
that its age policy is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
the particular business."" Since the BFOQ exception is inconsistent with
the general thrust of the ADEA to eliminate employment-related gener-
alizations based on age," the original enforcing agency of the ADEA, the
Department of Labor," recommended that courts and employers con-
strue the exception narrowly, and warned of its potential for abuse of
, See Player, supra note 11, at 749-50; text accompanying notes 16-18 infra.
,6 29 U.S.C. § 623(f(2) (1970); see Player, supra note 11, at 779-81 (general discussion of
bona fide seniority plan defense).
. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970); see Player, supra note 11, at 767-79 (general discussion of
bona fide benefit plan defense).
Is 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970). The Department of Labor (DOL) construed the BFOQ
defense in § 860.102 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102 (1976). The DOL
stated that courts should consider a BFOQ in the light of the relevant facts of each case. Id.
The DOL recommended a narrow construction of the age BFOQ since it is an exception to
the general ban against discrimination on the sole basis of age. Id. The DOL also stated that
the employer carried the burden of establishing the necessity for a BFOQ. Id.
9 See note 18 supra; Rosenblum, Age Discrimination in Employment and the Per-
missibility of Occupational Age Restrictions, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 1261, 1266 (1981) [herein-
after cited as Rosenblum] (BFOQ defense is most frequently used defense by employers).
See Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, 41 OHIO ST. L. J. 349, 380 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Age Discrimination]. In a typical BFOQ situation, the defendant charged
with a violation of the ADEA admits the discriminatory practices, but asserts that because
of the nature of his business, age is a necessary qualification of employment. Id. After the
defendant raises this affirmative defense, the burden of persuasion shifts to him to prove
the elements of the BFOQ defense. Id.; see Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir.
1977) (burden of proof on employer for BFOQ defense); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th cir. 1977) (same); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313
(6th Cir. 1975) (same). The Department of Labor also placed the burden of the BFOQ defense'
on the employer in its interpretive bulletin. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1976).
21 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970).
2 See note 8 supra. The ADEA's purpose is to promote individual ability rather than
age as the primary factor in employment decisions. Id. The BFOQ defense, however, allows
the employer to use age as a blanket generalization and to deny some older workers with
the ability to do the job the chance even to apply for the position. See Rosenblum, supra
note 19, at 1267; Note, The Scope of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exemption
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 57 CHI-KENT L. REv. 1145, 1148-49
(1981) [hereinafter cited as The Scope of the BFOQ]; Age Discrimination, supra note 20, at
383.
, See note 5 supra.
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ADEA purposes.24 Unfortunately, no clear guidelines for the scope or ap-
plication of the age BFOQ exist in either the sparse legislative history of
the exception or the administrative interpretations.25
Since neither the administrative agencies nor the legislatures have
clarified the BFOQ provision, the burden has fallen on the judicial
system to interpret and apply the BFOQ in individual cases. Judicial ap-
plication of the BFOQ, however, has produced a confusing and conflicting
amalgam of circuit court and district court decisions upon which the
Supreme Court has refused to act.2 Part of the courts' difficulty in
fashioning consistent tests to determine when age should be a BFOQ is
due to the myriad of fact situations involving the BFOQ defense which
the courts have faced. ' The major complicating factor in age BFOQ
cases, however, has been the sharp contrast between the rights of the
older worker as set out in the ADEA and the interests of public safety
24 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1976); see James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 2; Balancing the
Interest, supra note 2, at 1343.
25 See James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 9. The BFOQ provision of the ADEA has very
little explanatory legislative history. Id. Neither House or Senate hearings before the
passage of the ADEA explain the intent of statutory language. Id. The chairman of the
House subcommittee studying the bill made the only legislative statement relevant to the
BFOQ. His statement stressed the importance of individualized testing of the aged, but
gave no guidelines in regard to how the issue of individualized testing fits into the BFOQ
statutory provision. Id. at 9 n.73; Age Discrimination in Employment- Hearings on H.R.
3651, H.R. 3768, and H.R. 4221 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1967) (statement of Congressment Dent). See
generally H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in (1967) U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEwS 2213; S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in (1978) U.S.
CODE & AD. NEWS 504 (legislative intent of entire ADEA).
Besides the Department of Labor's mandate to interpret the BFOQ provision narrowly,
29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1976), the administrative agencies in charge of the ADEA also have
given little guidance on the BFOQ provision. See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at
1145.
26 See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1146; e.g., Smallwood v. United Air
Lines, Inc., No. 80-1111 (4th Cir., Oct. 8, 1981); Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 26 FEP
Cases 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1981); EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980); Arritt
v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561
(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1978); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d
224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). Several district courts have also considered the age BFOQ
issue. See Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Tuohy v. Ford
Motor Co., 490 F. Supp. 258, 261 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 456
(E.D. Ark. 1976).
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in both of the appealed BFOQ circuit court
cases. See Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 966 (1978); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
' See Balancing the Interest supra note 2, at 1360 (some BFOQ cases involve hiring
and others involve firing; BFOQ cases involve different types of occupations with different
levels of responsibility for public safety).
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found in nearly all the litigated BFOQ cases.28 Almost all of the occupa-
tions in issue in the age BFOQ cases have involved employee respon-
sibility for the safety of large numbers of people.' Courts dealing with
BFOQ cases that involve public safety have been tempted, despite ad-
ministrative mandates to the contrary, to interpret the BFOQ in favor of
the employer for fear of increasing the risk of harm to the public if
employers hire older workers .3 The relatively short history of case law
on the subject of the age BFOQ reflects the judicial struggle to reach a
balance between public safety and the aims of the ADEA.
31
All of the circuit court decisions determining the validity of age
BFOQs are the progeny of two conflicting cases, Hodgson v. Greyhound
Lines32 and Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 3 The Hodgson line of
cases has adopted a broad construction of the age BFOQ defense and
vests a great deal of discretion concerning age and employment prac-
tices in the employer.34 The Tamiami line of cases, on the other hand,
follows a more stringent and detailed test for the BFOQs fashioned from
several leading Title VII race and gender discrimination cases. 5
In Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines,38 the Seventh Circuit addressed the
question of whether Greyhound's refusal to hire new bus drivers over
the age of thirty-five qualified as a legitimate BFOQ defense to a charge
of age discrimination.3 7 The lower court in Hodgson had relied upon the
I See Player, supra note 11, at 766-67 (tension between safety concerns and rights of
older workers); Balancing the Interest supra note 2, at 1364 (public safety is common
thread in all BFOQ cases).
2' See, e.g., Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 80-1111 (4th Cir., Oct. 8, 1981)
(commerical air line pilot); Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 26 FEP Cases 1537, 1539
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (commercial airline pilot); EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1256
(7th Cir. 1980) (police chief job); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1270 (4th Cir. 1977) (police
job); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir. 1977) (test pilot);
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 228 (5th Cir. 1976) (bus driver); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974) (bus driver).
0 See text accompanying notes 106-154 infra.
", See notes 28 & 29 supra.
2 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974).
" 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); see The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1156-57
(Hodgson and Tamiami are leading BFOQ cases).
-1 See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1154, text accompanying notes 37-73
infra (discussion of 7th and D.C. Circuit courts' test for BFOQ).
" See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1154; text accompanying notes 74-105
infra (discussion of 4th, 5th and 8th Circuit court tests for BFOQ).
35 499 F.2d 859 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); see Balancing the Interest
supra note 2, at 1348 (Hodgson was first major court of appeals decision to develop test for
age BFOQ defense).
' 499 F.2d at 860. In Hodgson, the Secretary of Labor filed an age discrimination suit
against a bus carrier, Greyhound, for refusing to hire bus drivers over the age of thirty-five.
Id. at 860. Greyhound admitted to the discrigninatory practices, but claimed that age was a
bona fide occupational qualification for the job. Id. at 866. The lower court found for the
Secretary and held that Greyhound had not met its burden of proving the BFOQ exemption.
Id. The 7th Circuit Court reversed, however, and allowed the age limit policy to stand. Id. at
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standard in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.," a
case which dealt with the Title VII BFOQ sex discrimination defense,3 9
to hold that the age limit on bus drivers could not qualify as a BFOQ.40
The Weeks court had stated that for a gender BFOQ to exist the
employer must prove he had a factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all women would be unable to perform the job duties safely
and efficiently.41 The lower court in Hodgson applied the Weeks stan-
dard to age discrimination and found that the employer had failed to
carry his burden under the Weeks test.42 The lower court in Hodgson
then struck down the employer's BFOQ defense.43
The Seventh Circuit stated, however, that the Weeks standard was
too stringent and was inapplicable to the age discrimination case before
the court."' The court pointed out that the Weeks case did not involve
the safety of the public and that the standard for the BFOQ thus could
be stricter in Weeks than in a high safety risk case such as Hodgson.
45
865. The Hodgson court relied heavily on evidence introduced by Greyhound that the body
undergoes degenerative changes during the thirties that are impossible to detect medically.
Id. at 863. These changes in the body's physiology, Greyhound argued, made a risky prac-
tice of hiring drivers over the age of thirty-five. Id.
Greyhound admitted that the company's safest drivers were over thirty-five years old,
but they also had had nearly twenty years of experience with the company. Id. Greyhound
argued that it could never achieve the blend of age and Greyhound driving experience it
needed to produce the safest drivers if the court forced it to hire workers over thirty-five.
Id The company further stressed that its seniority system gave newly hired drivers the
rougher "extra board" runs, which were physically and mentally exhausting. Greyhound
argued that older workers being hired at age thirty-five or over could not meet the demands
of the extra board system, but would not be eligible for regular runs for at least ten years.
Id. at 864. Although the government tried to stress the increased maturity and experience
the older workers would have, the Hodgson court determined that age was a BFOQ, and
that the company could exclude all applications from workers over thirty-five regardless of
individual physical ability. Id. at 865.
408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). In Weeks, a telephone company declined the application
of a woman for the position of switchman. Id. at 231. The telephone company asserted that
sex was a BFOQ under Title VII because of the physically demanding activities the switch-
man's job entailed. Id. at 232. The court denied the BFOQ exemption, stating that the com-
pany had not met its burden of showing that all or substantially all women would be unable
to perform the job. Id. at 235.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970) (Title VII BFOQ defense).
0 499 F.2d at 861. The lower court in Hodgson probably relied on the Title VII Weeks
case because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains a BFOQ provision nearly
identical to the age BFOQ in the ADEA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1976); The Scope of
the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1146 n.5. Almost all of the age BFOQ cases subsequent to
Hodgson have turned to Title VII BFOQ precedent to set up tests for the age BFOQ. See
The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1146.
" 408 F.2d at 235.
" 499 F.2d at 861.
43 Id
" Id. at 861-62; see text accompanying note 45 infra. See also note 8 supra (applicability
of Title VII principles to age discrimination problems).
" 499 F.2d at 861-62.
1376 [Vol. 39:1371
THE AGE BFOQ DEFENSE
The Hodgson court then turned to two other Title VII cases, Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc. 46 and Spurlock v. United Air Lines, Inc.,"'
to fashion a broader guideline for the age discrimination BFOQ defense.49
The Diaz court had stated that gender could be the basis for discrimi-,
natory employment actions only if the employer could show that hiring
women would undermine the essence of its business.49
The Hodgson court adopted the Diaz standard" and explained that
the essence of the bus transportation industry was the safe transporta-
tion of passengers." The court then suggested that safety, the essence of
the bus industry, would be undermined if elimination of the age require-
ment would cause even a minimal increase in the risk of harm to passen-
gers.2 The Hodgson court also stressed the public safety factor in refer-
ring to dictum from the Spurlock decision that the higher the risk to the
public, and the higher the skill involved in the job, the more discretion
the employer should enjoy in setting potentially discriminatory limits in
employment practices. 3 The Hodgson court combined the Diaz essence
of the business test 4 and the Spurlock safety/discretion test 5 to fashion
a guideline for the BFOQ defense that only requires the employer to
show reasonable cause to believe that elimination of the age require-
ment would result in even a minimal increase in risk to the public. Fur-
ther, under Hodgson, if the business involves obvious public safety fac-
tors, courts should allow employers a great deal of discretion in setting
age limits for the hiring and firing of employees.'
The Seventh Circuit subsequently has extended the Hodgson rule in
" 442 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1971).
" 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
499 F.2d at 862-63; see text accompanying notes 49-55 infra.
442 F.2d at 388. In Diaz, the plaintiff charged an airline company with sex discrimi-
nation in failing to hire male flight attendants because of their sex. Id at 386. The airline
responded by admitting a per se violation of the Civil Rights Act, but argued that the com-
pany fell within the BFOQ exemption. Id. The airline argued that females were better
equipped to relieve the anxiety of the passengers than were males, and that the passengers
preferred female stewardesses. Id. at 387. However, the Diaz court found that safe trans-
portation was the essence of the airline business and that the airline had not proven that
hiring men would undermine the essence of the business. Id. at 388-89.
499 F.2d at 862.
51 Id.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 862-63. Spurlock involved a race discrimination suit against an airline that set
up pre-employment qualifications that allegedly discriminated against black pilots. 475 F.2d
at 217. The Spurlock court stated that when a job required high skill and involved a high
risk to public safety, the court should be cautious in requiring an employer to lower his stan-
dards. Id. at 219. The court allowed the qualifications, which included a college degree and
several hours of flight experience, to stand. Id. at 219-20.
See text accompanying note 49 supra.
See text accompanying note 53 supra.
499 F.2d at 863.57 Id.
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EEOC v. City of Janesville," an age discrimination case involving an age
limit for the hiring of police personnel. 9 The Janesville court, while ap-
pearing to follow the broad Hodgson rule," actually went beyond
Hodgson by suggesting that the employer's good faith and nondiscrimi-
natory intent in regard to the challenged age limit might be a sufficient
test for a BFOQ.6 The court further broadened the BFOQ defense to the
detriment of the older worker in its treatment of whether the employer
should consider the age of the applicant in connection with the whole
operation of the business or only the specific duties of the job for which
the worker was applying.2 The court ruled that the entire nature of the
business should be the determining factor to compare with age, not just
the specific duties of the job. 3 The normal variation among different
types of jobs in the same industry thus becomes irrelevant under the
Janesville BFOQ test.
4
A second extension of the Hodgson rationale occurred in a 1981 case,
Murnane v. American Airlines,65 concerning age limits for hiring com-
630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980). See generally, The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22,
at 1160-78 (thorough discussion of Janesville).
11 630 F.2d at 1256. See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1165 (Janesville
decision broadens BFOQ exemption more than Hodgson). The Janesville decision involved
the forced retirement of a policeman at the age 55 from his police chief position. The police
chief's job entailed only administrative work, and not actual public protection duties. 630
F.2d at 1256-57.
o 630 F.2d at 1257-59; see text accompanying notes 57 & 58 supra.
61 630 F.2d at 1258-59. See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1171. Although
the Hodgson court mentioned the defendant's good faith in its opinion, the Janesville court
declared that the good faith of the employer is enough even in the absence of empirical data
to uphold the BFOQ defense. 630 F.2d at 1258-59. See note 123 infra.
6 630 F.2d at 158; see The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1166-70.
630 F.2d at 1258.
" Id. The Janesville court stated that it was irrelevant that a particular occupation
may be encompassed within the business. Id. The court believed that the business, and not
the occupation, should be the focal point for the BFOQ inquiry. Id. Thus, all the various
types of jobs within the police department of Janesville were lumped together to determine
if age was a BFOQ for the whole "business" of the police station. Id. at 1258-59; cf. Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 230 (5th Cir. 1976) (job qualifications must be ex-
amined with age to determine if age is BFOQ); see The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at
1167-69 (statutory and legislative intent mandate against the Janesville interpretation).
The very broad interpretation of Janesville court gave to the BFOQ defense may be
misleading. The employer in the Janesville case was the state, and the discriminatory age
policy was set out in a state statute. The extreme deference to the state legislature court
displayed in dictum may have colored the Janesville opinion. 630 F.2d at 1259; see The
Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1175-77.
5 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Murnane case involved an airline age limit for hiring
new flight officers. American Airlines had an established ranking system in which pilots be-
gan as flight officers and worked up to the rank of captain in fourteen to twenty years. Id at
99 n.2. If the airline determined it could not promote the pilots, the company fired them. Id.
at 99. Further, the Federal Aviation Administration requires retirement of pilots at age 60.
14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1980). American Airlines thus alleged that a pilot hired past the age
of thirty might not have time to reach the rank of captain before retirement. Id at 100.
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mercial airline pilots.6 The Murnane court followed the Hodgson ra-
tionale by determining that the safe transportation of airline passengers
was the essence of American's business. 7 The court then stated that the
airline had shown some evidence that elimination of the age requirement
would undermine safety because of a potential marginal increase in the
risk of airplane accidents caused by older pilots. 8 Toward the end of its
opinion, however, the Murnane court dispensed with even the relatively
minor Hodgson protection for older workers. 9 The Murnane court stated
that if safety is the critical element of the employer's business, the
courts should automatically defer to the employer's judgment in employ-
ment practices. 0 The District of Columbia Circuit in the Murnane deci-
sion thus displayed the most severe aversion to date to tampering with
an employer's business discretion when the business involves safety,
even to the point of allowing discriminatory policies to stand.' Thus,
while Hodgson itself requires a showing that the elimination of an age
policy undermines the essence of the business, 2 later Hodgson line cases
have moved toward a very lenient, pure good faith showing by the
employer that safety may be at risk.
3
In constrast to the Seventh and D.C. Circuits' approach to BFOQ
defenses, the progeny of Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. 4 have
established more stringent tests for employers to meet in proving age as
a BFOQ defense.75 In Tamiami, the court considered the legality of a
maximum age limit policy for hiring bus drivers.8 The Tamiami court
American also argued that the safest pilots were those who were trained in the entire
American pilot program, from flight officer to captain. American therefore contended that
safety to the public would be decreased by hiring new pilots too old to go through the entire
ranking program. Id. The Murnane court accepted the airline's argument and upheld the
policy as a legitimate BFOQ.
The factual situation of the Murnane case may have affected the court's opinion. Even
if the age policy had been struck, the court found that Murnane was not competitively quali-
fied for the pilot's position. Id. at 101-02. The court thus had a less than appealing case fac-
tually in which to find for the pilot plaintiff.
See note 65 supra.
, 667 F.2d at 101 (court cited Diaz essence of the business test which Hodgson incor-
porated).
Id.
' See note 37 supra. The Hodgson test requires that the employer show harm to the
essence of his business if he hired older workers. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
"' 667 F.2d at 101.
71 Id
2 499 F.2d at 862-63.
,3 667 F.2d at 101; 630 F.2d at 1258-59.
' 531 F.2d at 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
, See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1154; text accompanying notes 75-105
infra (discussion of Tamiami line of cases' narrowing of BFOQ in order to further ADEA ob-
jectives).
,1 531 F.2d at 226. The facts involved in Tamiami are markedly similar to those in
Hlodgson. See note 37 supra. In Tamiami the defendant bus company refused to hire intercity
bus drivers between the ages of 40 and 65. 531 F.2d at 226. The company claimed that the
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first turned to the Diaz essence of the business test, and required as a
first step that the employer show that the challenged job qualifications
were reasonably necessary to the essence of the business." The Tamiami
court then added the Weeks "ability of all or substantially all of the
class" test"8 as an additional hurdle for the employer to pass before the
employer may claim age as a BFOQ.78 The Tamiami court used the
original Weeks rule that an employer must show cause to believe that all
or substantially all of the class discriminated against could not perform
the occupational duties." The Tamiami court, however, mitigated the
severity of the Weeks rule by upgrading dictum in a Weeks footnote
concerning the impossibility of individualized testing to the level of an
alternative defense for the employer." The Weeks court had stated in a
footnote that in employer might be able to sustain a BFOQ defense if he
could show the impossibility or impracticality of individualized testing.2
The Tamiami court shaped the original Weeks test and the individualized
new drivers would have to spend several years as "extra board" drivers, a strenuous occu-
pation, because of their seniority system. Id. at 231. The bus company argued that older
drivers not trained by Tamiami would be unable to perform these functions safely. Id. The
expert testimony conflicted regarding whether age had a negative impact on driver safety
that outweighed the benefits of maturity. Id. at 228. After careful consideration of the
Department of Labor's mandate to construe the BFOQ defense narrowly, the court found
that Tamiami met the burden of proving that age was a BFOQ. Id. at 229-30 & 238. The
court found that Tamiami had shown that the job qualifications were reasonably necessary
to the essence of the business, safety. Id. at 236. Although the defendant did not show that
all or substantially all older workers were unable to drive the buses safely, it did show that
it would be highly impracticable individually to test each applicant for ability. Id. at 234-35.
The Tamiami court ultimately found for the defendant, pointing out frequently the public
safety aspect involved in the case. Id. at 236-38.
Id. at 236. Although both Hodgson and Tamiami claim to follow the Diaz test, the
Tamiami court gave a slightly different wording to the Diaz test. In Hodgson, the court ex-
amined whether the elimination of the age requirement would undermine the essence of the
business. 499 F.2d at 862. In Tamiami, however, the court stated that Diaz required that
the job qualifications which the employer invokes to justify his discrimination must be
reasonably necessary to the essence of the business. 531 F.2d at 236. By stating the Diaz
test negatively, the Hodgson interpretation slightly favors the defendant. Rather than ex-
amining the age policy on its merits, the Hodgson court seemed satisfied with only discuss-
ing the effect of termination of the policy might have on the employer's business. 499 F.2d
at 862. The court thus focused upon the rights of the employer and public safety rather than
on the rights of the older worker. In constrast, the Tamiami interpretation of Hodgson re-
quires an examination of the allegedly discriminatory policies to determine their relation-
ship to the business. 531 F.2d at 236.
78 See text accompanying note 41 supra (Weeks test).
531 F.2d at 235-38.
Id. at 235-36.
81 Id. The alternative of being able to show the impracticality of testing individually
rather than to show that all or most of the older workers were unfit for the job was only a
footnote in the Weeks opinion. 408 F.2d at 235 n.5. The Tamiami court, however, treated
the impracticality alternative as a full-fledged choice, with no explanation for the upgrading
of the impracticality requirement. 531 F.2d at 235-36.
408 F.2d at 235 n.5.
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testing footnote into an either/or standard. 3 Under Tamiami, therefore,
the employer can show either the inability of older workers to perform,
or, if it is unable to carry that burden, the employer can show the im-
possibility or impracticality of individualized testing.4 The court also
eased the rigorous burden of the Weeks test by reiterating the Spurlock
principle that as the public safety factor increases, so should the
employer's discretionary powers. 5 The Tamiami test further favors the
employer in the test's implicit acceptance of the bus company's argu-
ment that its seniority system would be hurt by the elimination of the
age requirement.8 The Tamiami decision suggests that inquiry into
other established business practices relating to age besides the age
policy itself is inappropriate. 7
The Eighth Circuit, in Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,88
adopted the Tarhiami test verbatim in a commercial pilot age limit case. 9
The Houghton case is significant on its facts because the Houghton court
applied the Tamiami test to the firing of older workers rather than to
the hiring of new employees. The court in Houghton found that age was
'3 See Balancing the Interesi supra note 2, at 1351 n.89; text accompanying note 84 in-
fra. The Tamiami court was the first court to use an eitherlor standard with the Weeks
tests of inability to perform and inability to test. See Balancing the Interest supra note 2,
at 1351 n.89.
531 F.2d at 235-36.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 231, 237-38. The Tamiami court stated that Tamiami's seniority system, which
relegated new drivers to the demanding "extra board" runs and gave senior drivers a choice
of extra board or regular runs, was not beyond examination under the ADEA, if it led to
age discrimination. Id. at 237. The Tamiami court did not examine the seniority system and
gave no reason for its failure to do so, even though the seniority system did lead to discrimi-
nation, because the company believed aging drivers could not cope with the extra board. Id.
at 237-38.
" See note 86 supra & note 130 infra; Player, supra note 11, at 760-62 (Tamiami court
incorrect in refusing to examine seniority system).
553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977).
Id at 564.
Id. at 563. In Houghton, an airline company found it necessary to reduce its staff of
pilots because of a decline in business production. Id. The company transferred three pilots,
including the named plaintiff, from test pilot duty to other nonflight jobs solely on the basis
of their age (all above forty-five). Id. Houghton was dissatisfied with his demotion, tried to
look for outside work, failed, and returned to the company in a nonflight job. Id. The airline
fired Houghton soon thereafter for nonproductivity. Id. The company admitted a per se
violation of the ADEA, but contended that age was a BFOQ for test pilots. Id. Even though
Houghton produced a large amount of evidence showing that aircraft accidents decreased
with the pilot's age, that test pilots aged slower than the rest of the population, and that he
was personally in excellent health with little risk of experiencing a heart attack or stroke in
flight, the lower court found that age was a BFOQ for test pilots. Id. at 563-64. The Eighth
Circuit reversed, however, on the ground that the company had not shown that all or most
older test pilots could not perform their duties, or that the company could not examine test
pilots individually for ability. Id. at 564. On the contrary, the record showed that medical ex-
perts could detect disabling medical conditions affecting pilots with almost foolproof ac-
curacy. Id. The court did not disucss the public safety aspect found in Tamiami or Hodgson
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not a BFOQ because of medical testimony that indicated that individual
testing for pilots' ability was possible." The court also found that many
pilots in their forties and fifties were able to perform their duties quite
safely."2 The plaintiff in Houghton, which was a job termination case, had
the advantage over new applicants of impressive work and health
records with the defendant airline. 3 Commentators have suggested that
a court will be less likely to approve age as a BFOQ in a firing case be-
cause the individual's performance and safety records can be introduced
at trial and are a known factor as opposed to the guesswork involved in
hiring new older workers. 4 The court in Houghton also noted that the oc-
cupation in issue was that of test pilot, rather than commercial airline
pilot. 5 Fewer people in the public at large are at risk in a test pilot situa-
tion than in a commercial pilot case so that public safety was not a major
issue in Houghton."' The Houghton court, in fact, left out any reference
to the Spurlock safety/employer discretion rule found in the previous
age BFOQ cases. 7
The Fourth Circuit also has adopted the basic Tamiami-Weeks/Diaz
standard,99 but apparently has eliminated the Spurlock idea of high risk
because Houghton was not a commercial pilot, but a test pilot who carried no passengers.
See Note, Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation: Age Discrimination and Test
Pilots, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 187, 196 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Age Discrimination and Test
Pilots].
1 553 F.2d at 564.
92 Id-
11 Id. at 563. In Houghton, two doctors found the plaintiff test pilot in exceptional
physical condition, even in comparison to other test pilots. Id. The doctors were 99.9% cer-
tain that the plaintiff would not suffer a heart attack or stroke while in flight. Id.
"' See James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 7; Balancing the Interest, supra note 2, at
1360-61. Because courts can measure and assess an employee's performance in a contested
discharge case, a court will be more likely to base its decision on specific capabilities in the
job context. Balancing the Interest, supra note 2, at 1361. However, a court will be more
likely to fall back on general assumptions about age in the absence of concrete individual
data. Id. A Houghton commentator thus warns that courts probably will interpret Hodgson
narrowly as applying only to firing cases in which a great deal of specific individual informa-
tion about the plaintiff is available. See James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 7.
553 F.2d at 563.
See Age Discrimination and Test Pilots, supra note 90, at 195-96. The test pilot does
not have as great a degree of responsibility for the public as do commercial airline pilots. Id.
at 196. The test pilot's duties do not include the transportation or protection of the public.
Id. Many test pilots, however, do fly over heavily populated areas at some time in their
flights, so a certain degree of risk to the public is present for test pilots. Id. at 195.
1 Id. at 196. The lower court in Hodgson did address the issue of public safety and
analogized the occupation of test pilot to airline pilot. Id at 195-96. The Eighth Circuit,
however, ignored the issue of public safety in its opinion. Id at 196. Either the court decided
that the test pilot occupation did not involve the issue of public safety, or it purposefully left
public safety out of its test for BFOQ in order to avoid allowing the employer too much
discretion. See text accompanying notes 36-73 supra (previous BFOQ cases gave employer
broad discretion when public safety involved).
" See text accompanying notes 76-87 supra (Tamiami standard).
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to the public mandating greater employer discretion." Arritt v. Grise ll,'"
a police firing case, and Smallwood v. United Airlines,"' a commercial
pilot case, involved occupations with a high degree of responsibility to
the public.'0 ' While both cases expressly favored the basic Tamiami
test, °0 neither mentioned the Spurlock factor of increased employer
discretion.' In fact, the Fourth Circuit in both Arritt and Smallwood
stressed the need to keep the BFOQ defense as narrow as possible to
promote the overall meaning of the ADEA."'
Both the Tamiami and Hodgson lines of tests are vulnerable to
criticism on the ground that the tests have defined the BFOQ exemption
too broadly in contravention of the spirit of the ADEA, using public safe-
ty to avoid close scrutiny of employer motives."' Two aspects of the
tests in particular reflect the broadening effects of the present tests on
the BFOQ defense.' ° First, the tests arbitrarily vest too much unsuper-
vised discretion in the employer with respect to employment practices
and the older worker. 1"' Second, the courts have not focused clearly
enough on the potential for individual testing before approving the use
of a BFOQ generalization based on age."'1
The circuit courts have used the catch phase of "danger to the public
safety" to give broad and undefined amounts of discretion to employers
and this discretion weakens any purported guidelines set up in the rest
" See text accompanying. note 53 supra (discussion of Spurlock rule); Player, supra
note 11, at 766-67 (Fourth Circuit cases appear to be narrowing earlier BFOQ cases by not
relying simply on public safety generalization).
"0 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
101 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3948 (April 1982).
"' Arritt involved the denial of a 40 year old policeman's application by the police civil
service commission on the ground of age. 567 F.2d at 1269. The defendants alleged, among
other things, that the age requirement was a BFOQ for the job of active duty policeman. Id.
at 1271. The lower court entered summary judgment for the defendants using the Hodgson
rule as a standard to judge the legitimacy of the age policy. Id. The Fourth Circuit reversed
and remanded on the ground that the lower court had erred in using the Hodgson test
rather than the Tamiami test to judge the BFOQ. Id.
Smallwood involved an age limit set by the commercial airlines on initial hiring of
pilots. 661 F.2d at 305. The district court found that age was a BFOQ for the job of commer-
cial pilot, but the Fourth Circuit, following the Arritt rationale, reversed. Id. at 307-09.
10 Id.; 567 F.2d at 1271.
"' 661 F.2d at 307-09; 567 F.2d at 1271 n.14.
105 661 F.2d at 307 (need to keep BFOQ defense narrow); 567 FR2d at 1271 (rejection of
broad Hodgson rule).
10 See Player, supra note 11, at 754-65; James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 1-6; Balancing
the Interes4 supra note 2, at 1354-57.
" See text accompanying notes 108-09 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 119-41 infra; Player, supra note 11, at 763-64 (courts
have allowed defendants to carry burden of proof on BFOQ too easily, using unfounded
speculation); The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 2?, at 1174-75 (employers have enjoyed too
much discretion in age/retirement practices).
10 See text accompanying notes 142-67 infra; Balancing the Interest supra note 2, at
1356-57; The Age Discrimination, supra note 4, at 383-84.
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of the opinions.11 The courts' apparent rationale is that employers whose
everyday business practices involve public safety are better equipped to
set hiring and firing standards to choose the best qualified workers for
the job than is the judicial system."1 While employers involved in fields
which endanger a large segment of the public may be in a better position
to analyze safety needs and worker performance,"' they should not have
an absolute, free reign to set employment standards with no inquiry into
the motivations behind the standards."' The courts should be able to ex-
amine the validity of assumptions and possible stereotypical conceptions
that underlie business decisions concerning older workers when a
worker files a charge of age discrimination against a particular
employer."' The majority of courts to date have not demanded empirical
evidence of the effect of the hiring of older workers on safety.1 When
one court did demand and examine empirical data on safety, it found that
older workers actually increased the safety of the business.1 ' The court
thus discerned no need for extra discretion for the employer when his
business involved safety, and so left out the Spurlock increased discre-
tion guideline in its opinion. " 7 The enactors of the ADEA surely did not
contemplate a meek acquiescence by the courts to the hiring and firing
"' See Player, supra note 11, at 766. Using a concern of public safety as their rationle,
courts have not actually analyzed the safety and medical evidence in BFOQ cases. Id.
Rather, courts have acted on generalized assumptions detrimental to the aged for fear of
risk to the public. Id Placid acceptance of an employer's plea of safety without an examina-
tion of medical and statistical evidence concerning older workers perpetuates the discrimi-
nation problem at which the ADEA was aimed in the name of public safety. Id Most courts
to date have set up relatively strict tests for employers to meet in regard to the BFOQ
defense, but have promptly weakened or destroyed the tests by giving the employer unfet-
tered discretion almost as an afterthought when the defendant raises the public safety
issue. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d at 230; Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 499 F.2d at 862.
.. Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d at 238; Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d at
863.
112 See Player, supra note 11, at 756-57.
' See note 98 supra (purpose of ADEA is to insure employment decisions are made
with nondiscriminatory motives); 531 F.2d at 236 n.30 (courts must not allow employers ab-
solute discretion in safety standards).
.. See Player, supra notee 1, at 766-67; The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1175,
1177-78. But see Balancing the Interest, supra note 2, at 1364-65. One commentator suggests
that courts are not able to delve deeply enough into medical testing possibilities and other
employment data to determine when age limits are reasonable BFOQs. Id. Rather than in-
crease the employer's discretion to make the decisions, the commentator suggested the ad-
ministrative handling of the problem of age BFOQs by an agency equipped to do the
necessary research on age and employment. Id. Through the use of employer applications to
the agency for the use of a BFOQ, more equitable decisions based on all the current medical
and safety data will be possible. Id. at 1362-64.
"I See Player, supra note 11, at 766. The Hodgson and Tamiami courts permitted
generalized conclusions that safety risks increased with age. Id. at 754, 756.
.. 553 F.2d at 563 (accident rate of pilots decreases with age).
.1. See note 97 supra.
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practices of employers, but rather foresaw a healthy inquiry into the
causes and the effects of these decisions, even if the business involved
public safety."8
The Hodgson line of tests presents the most blatant examples of ex-
cessive discretion given to employers in the name of public safety" The
Hodgson court cited as an unquestionable caveat the Spurlock principle
advocating great discretion in public safety businesses,"' rather than at-
tempting to balance the interests of public safety versus employment of -
older workers."' The Hodgson court's flat assertion of the Spurlock rule
effectively cuts off inquiry into the motivation of the employer for setting
up his allegedly discriminatory age policy. The Janesville police hiring
test does allow an inquiry into the employer's good faith in setting the
age standard," but stops far short of allowing a consideration of discrim-
inatory effect as opposed to intent on the part of the employer."' If the
employer's actions meet the Janesville good faith test, the test sets no
limits on how the employer may implement or administer the good faith
policy." 4 The Murnane pilot test sums up the Hodgson perspective by
sweepingly concluding that courts are ill-equipped to make age policy
decisions when the business at issue involves public safety, and that
courts should leave employers to their own judgment as much as possi-
ble.
25
While the Tamiami line of cases do not accede so easily to employer
discretion, analysis of the Tamiami decision itself reveals some tendency
to defer to the employer's judgment, particularly when the subject of
public safety is present."8 The Tamiami decision begins by setting a
relatively precise Weeks/Diaz guideline for employers that all or sub-
stantially all of the older workers must be unable to perform or that in-
dividualized testing of applicants is impossible." The Tamiami court
... See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (purpose of the ADEA is to prevent arbitrary age discrimina-
tion).
, See Balancing the Interest supra note 2, at 1355.
1 499 F.2d at 862-63.
121 See Balancing the Interest supra note 2, at 1355 (Hodgson court may have relied on
Spurlock to appear to strengthen its lenient interpretation of Diaz).
12 630 F.2d at 1258-59.
"' See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1172-73. The Janesville court's em-
phasis on the employer's good faith is in error, since Congress designed the ADEA to pro-
hibit discriminatory effect as well as discriminatory intent, regardless of the employer's
good faith. Id. at 1172. By allowing the employer complete discretion as to age policies as
long as they are carried out in good faith, the BFOQ will allow a "continuation of the arbi-
trary policies the ADEA was intended to prevent." Id. at 1171-72.
2 Id. at 1172-73.
in 667 F.2d at 101.
.2. 531 F.2d at 236 (the greater the safety factor, the more stringent the job qualifica-
tions may be); see Balancing the Interest, supra note 2, at 1356. The tendency of the
Tamiami court to reduce scrutiny of employment practices when the business involves
public safety is dangerous because the company may set very high qualifications that would
effectively eliminate all older applicants. Id. at 1356.
' 531 F.2d at 234-36.
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states, however, after its formulation of the Weeks test, that employers
involved in safety issues should have some degree of discretion in labor
practices.128 The Tamiami court revised the Spurlock principle to read
that the higher the risk the more stringent job qualifications may be,
rather than the more discretion the employer should have, thus remov-
ing some of the emphasis on pure unbounded employer discretion."
Even though the Tamiami court softened the Spurlock principle,
however, the very presence of the principle makes the Tamiami case am-
biguous as a guide.to determining the amount of discretion an employer
legitimately can exercise. 30 Fortunately, the more recent Tamiami line
cases have ameliorated some of the Tamiami ambiguity in that none of
the opinions mention the applicability of the Spurlock rule even though
all of the cases involve some degree of public safety."'
In addition to stressing employer discretion, the circuit courts have
broadened the BFOQ defense by deemphasizing the importance of the in-
dividual's ability to perform the job duties regardless of his age."2 In-
stead, the courts either disregard or place low priority on the alter-
native of individualized testing.' The disregard of individual ability is
incorrect for two reasons. First, the ADEA specifically emphasizes its
preference for individual testing over age-based generalizations." Sec-
ond, the opinions, while expressing great concern for safety, ignore the
'" Id- at 236.
121 Id. The Hodgson court dwelt on lessening the burden of the employer to explain the
employer's discriminatory practices in safety cases. 499 F.2d at 863. The Tamiami court,
however, just stated that the job qualifications could be more stringent, not that they would
not be subject to review by the courts. 531 F.2d at 236.
130 See James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 5-6. Further evidence of Tamiami's ambiguity
toward employer discretion, besides its adoption of the Spurlock rule, is the court's decision
not to review the employer's age-based seniority plan which was an integral part of the
defendant's BFOQ defense. 531 F.2d at 237-38. The Tamiami court's refusal to consider the
seniority-run "extra board" system was erroneous for two reasons. Player, supra note 11, at
761. First, the company should not be allowed to refuse to hire qualified workers because at
some future time under the seniority system the demands of the job will become too great.
Id. For example, a forty-year old driver could probably handle the extra run, but a fifty-year
old driver might not. Yet, under Tamiami's seniority system, a new driver might have to
stay on the "extra board" runs for over ten years. An employer should not be allowed to
refuse the older worker's application when he is able to perform the job just because of the
future possibility of having to fire him because of a seniority system. 1d. at 763. Firing the
worker later would be less discriminatory than never hiring him or giving him a chance to
perform at all. Id.
In addition, § 4(f)(2) of the ADEA provides that no employee plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual. Id. Arguably, the "employee benefits plans" referred to in-
clude seniority plans. Id. The Tamiami court thus may have been wrong under the act to
allow Tamiami's seniority plan to block Usery's application for employment. Id.
,.. See note 104 supra; Player, supra note 11, at 764. One commentator believed that
the absence of the Spurlock test from Arritt is important in narrowing the scope of the
BFOQ. Id. The omission of any mention of seniority systems as a variable for denying con-
sideration for employment is also important. Id.
132 See text accompanying notes 133-57 infra.
1' Id.
,M, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b); see note 22 supra.
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possible aid to safety that individual testing could achieve."5 Individual
testing of older workers could ensure a blend of health, maturity, and ex-
perience in the older worker for the employer."6 Extensive inquiry into
the feasibility of testing applicants or older employees individually for
ability should be mandatory before the determination of whether age
alone would be a legitimate generalization upon which to base an
employment decision.
The Hodgson line of cases violates the policy of the ADEA in a more
unabashed fashion than does the Tamiami line, although Tamiami also
effectively relegates the individual testing issue to a relatively low
priority through a creative interpretation of Weeks dictum.'7 The
Hodgson court dealt with the ADEA's emphasis on individualized
testing by ignoring it." 8 Although the Hodgson court considered and re-
jected in dictum the feasibility of individual testing for bus drivers, the
court did not incorporate the idea into its final test for a BFOQ. 1"9 In-
stead, the Hodgson test focused on whether the eligibility of older
workers would undermine the essence of the business.4 ' The Hodgson
test thus implicitly discusses older workers as a class, rather than on an
individualized basis."'
The Janesville police firing case, besides adopting the Hodgson test
that does not promote individual testing of ability,' stresses the group
rather than the individualized concept in another very subtle way. The
Janesville court considered the applicant's age in relation to the entire
business operation involved in the conflict, not just to the specific duties
of the occupation subject to the age policy.'' By shifting the focus away
11 See Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 563 (1977). Individual
testing, such as the medical test performed in Hodgson, allows airlines to be almost certain
that their pilots will not suffer heart attacks while in flight. Id. at 564. Individual testing
would allow healthy older pilots to fly, which would increase safety since risk of airplane ac-
cidents decreases as the pilot's age increases. Id.
Il, See id. at 564 (older pilots have better safety records).
' See text accompanying notes 146-53 infra.
15 See Balancing the Interest supra note 2, at 1356. The effect of Hodgson is to ex-
clude the possibility of individualized testing. Id.
"1 449 F.2d at 864. The Hodgson court mentioned the government's argument that
employers should test drivers on the basis of their "functional" age rather than their
chronological age. Id. The court dismissed the functional age argument by stating that the
feasibility of individualized testing was "questionable." Id. The court, however, did not re-
quire Greyhound to produce evidence of the impracticality of testing for ability. Id
Id. at 862.
' See Balancing the Interest, supra note 2, at 1356. The Murnane decision perpetuates
the Hodgson line of reasoning by failing to consider the possibility of individual testing for
the test pilot's job involved in Murnane. See 667 F.2d at 101. The Murnane court pointed
out that it did not need to discuss the testing of the pilot plaintiff, because the airlines
established seniority system was the real basis for refusing to hire older pilots. Id.
" See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1165 (Janesville follows Hodgson, and
goes further in broadening BFOQ defense).
"' 630 F.2d at 1258. In Janesville, the police chief was fired after he reached age fifty-
five. Id. at 1256. The police chief, however, performed only administrative duties. Id. The
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from the specific occupational duties, the court also implicitly rendered
impossible the testing and matching of individual applicants for those
specific duties.144 The Janesville test instead focuses on whether age
would be a relevant factor in the overall business, which may include
several types of duties with broad variations in the physical and mental
qualities necessary to perform those duties.
1'4 5
In an analysis of the area of individualized testing, the Tamiami line
of cases fares only slightly better than the Hodgson line. While Tamiami
does incorpordte a test for individual ability into its final BFOQ rule, it
does so in a negative and subordinate sense.'46 The Tamiami rule man-
dates that either the employer prove that all or substantially all of the
class are unable to perform the job, which implicitly groups workers or
applicants as a class, or, if the employer cannot carry this burden, that
he prove the impossibility of individualized testing.147 The first inquiry
thus is into workers as a class, and only if the employer cannot pass the
first test is he forced to determine the feasibility of individual testing.148
The Tamiami court also phrased the idea of individualized testing in the
negative sense of proving the impossibility of testing, which further de-
emphasizes the importance of the issue under ADEA purposes.4 In sup-
port of individualized testing, however, the Tamiami court modified the
Diaz essence of the business test to focus on the specific job qualifica-
tions. 5 ' Particularly when viewed against the Seventh Circuit's rejection
of the consideration of specific occupational duties, 5' the Tamiami
court's rewording of the Diaz test seems supportive of the individualized
testing spirit of the ADEA."'
Subsequent Tamiami line cases, while improving on the employer
discretion/safety aspect of Tamiami, have done little to improve the
status of individualized testing, since they have merely followed the
Janesville court, however, refused to consider the duties involved in the job of police chief
and the plaintiff's ability to perform them. Id. at 1258. Instead, the court ruled that age was
important to the business of police work, and that the particular jobs within that business
were of no consequence under the ADEA BFOQ defense. Id.
.. See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1166-67.
"I See notes 143 & 144 supra.
... See text accompanying notes 112-114 supra; Balancing the Interest supra note 2, at
1356-57. Tamiami violated Week's spirit by shifting the focus away from individual testing
of ability. Id. at 1357.
... 531 F.2d at 235.
"' See 531 F.2d at 235. The Tamiami test first focused on whether the employer proved
that all women would be unable to perform their duties. "All" women connotes a class con-
cept rather than an individualized concept.
... See Balancing the Interest supra note 2, at 1357. The Tamiami court phrased the
individual testing prong of the Weeks test so that it emphasized the employer's expense
and effort, rather than the individual's right to be tested for his ability. Id.
" 531 F.2d at 236. The Tamiami court stated that the job qualifications must go to the
essence of the business. Id.
"' See text accompanying notes 143-45 infra.
152 See note 77 supra.
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Weeks/Tamiami standard without questioning the order or substance of
the test.10 The sole exception is the Smallwood pilot hiring case, in
which the Fourth Circuit discussed at some length the individual testing
procedures for pilots and the medical evidence introduced at trial which
suggested that pilots could be tested individually.154 The court, after
finding that the employer's assertion of a BFOQ did not satisfy the first
prong of the Tamiami standard, went on to consider whether the BFOQ
satisfied the individual testing aspect.155 Smallwood thus suggests a
possible trend toward equalizing the individualized testing prong of the
Tamiami test or even requiring that courts consider the prongs jointly
rather than as an either/or standard.
1 5
6
Courts need a new and narrower test to determine when age should
serve as the basis for a BFOQ defense because of the discretion and indi-
vidualized testing problems in the two present lines of cases.57 The new
test needs to incorporate at least three factors to ensure that the
ADEA's antidiscriminatory purposes will be given effect.155 First, the
court needs to look at the feasibility of testing older individual em-
ployees or applicants for the specific job in controversy to determine
each individual's unique ability to perform the required tasks, particular-
ly if the job involves public safety.1 59 If an accurate and economically
- feasible"5 method of testing is available, the question of allowing age as a
See 661 F.2d at 307; 567 F.2d at 1271.
154 661 F.2d at 307-09. The Smallwood court emphasized that the defendant airline's
present medical exam could detect potential disabling medical problems in pilots. Id. at
308-09. Medical exams also could predict the risk of heart attack or stroke with a high rate
of certainty. Id. The defendant airline would not even have to institute new individualized
tests in order to detect medical problems in older pilot applicants. See id. The Smallwood
court thus held that the defendant had failed to show the impracticability of individualized
testing to enable the airline to take advantage of the BFOQ defense. Id.
155 Id.
1-4 See James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 6 (both portions of Weeks test should be met
to justify BFOQ defense).
157 See Players, supra note 11, at 766-67; The Age Discrimination, supra note 4, at
383-84.
I See text accompanying notes 159-66 infra.
119 See Player, supra note 11, at 766; The Age Discrimination, supra note 4, at 383-84.
160 One major argument against a narrow interpretation of the BFOQ defense is that
employers cannot afford individualized testing. The cost argument may be valid in areas in
which medical technology has not produced an accurate and relatively inexpensive test. See
Age Discrimination, supra note 20, at 407-08. In such cases, an age BFOQ generalization
may be the only practical way that employers can ensure the safety of their customers. See
id. Too often, however, testing cost arguments by the employer hide other less valid
economic arguments against hiring and retaining older employees. Hiring or retaining older
employees often costs employers more in increased salaries and pensions than consistent
hiring of new and inexperienced workers. See The Cost of Growing Old Business Necessity
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565, 581 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as The Cost of Growing Old]. Although the ADEA discourages the influence of purely
age-based economic motives such as salaries on employment decisions, 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(b)
(1980), employers naturally will be tempted to discriminate against higher-salaried older
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generalized BFOQ should never even arise.161 Second, if testing is not
possible, the court needs to determine if age is the best and the nar-
rowest generalization available to employ qualified workers.162 In order
to avoid unnecessary generalizations, the court needs to examine closely
the exact job duties, and make certain that no unsupported assumptions
about age and job duties underlie the analysis.63 The employer should
have to support each assertion that an older worker is less able to per-
form a specific task of his job than a younger one by convincing empir-
ical data, not just generalized assumptions. 4 Last, the court should look
beyond an employer's blanket assertion of risk to the public for other
motives that the employer may have for wanting to employ younger
workers, such as the ability to pay lower wages to less experienced
employees."61 Courts should analyze carefully factors that the employer
uses to justify its age policy, such as seniority plans, in order to guard
against hidden discriminatory motives.166
The foregoing BFOQ test is suggested as a broad guideline for the
judiciary to follow when considering age -discrimination cases. The pro-
posed test, however, like the Hodgson "7 and Tamiami tests,66 may prove
superficial and inadequate in practice until Congress resolves the
underlying political dilemma which created the present age BFOQ con-
flict in the circuits. 66 Simply stated, the BFOQ dilemma involves tension
between .the right of older workers to employment security and the
workers, particularly if business is in a decline. See The Cost of Growing Old, supra at
581-82. However, narrowing the BFOQ and thereby increasing the collective age of the
workforce can be an economic benefit to certain employers. Older employees, with their ex-
perience and judgment, actually have increased safety levels in certain occupations, thereby
leading to fewer accidents and fewer concomitant law suits. See 553 F.2d at 563. Also, some
commentators have noted that employer compliance with the spirit of the ADEA which in-
cludes a narrow BFOQ defense could lead to fewer suits under the ADEA itself by dis-
gruntled applicants or employees and better relations with the labor force in general. See
The Cost of Growing Old, supra at 595.
"66 See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1166. Some recent cases have noted
that medical research has progressed to the point that doctors can detect debilitating
medical problems in older employees or applicants with surprising accuracy and efficiency,
and at a relatively low cost to the employer. See Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553
F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir. 1977) (possible to detect disabling physical condition in test pilot with
virtually foolproof accuracy); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 27 FEP Cases 904, 908 (C.D.
Cal. 1981) (undetected heart disease can be predicted with up to 99% accuracy as to short-
term problems).
162 See Player, supra note 11, at 766-67; The Age Discrimination, supra note 4, at 384.
16 See Player, supra note 11, at 766 (recently courts have been demanding proof of ac-
tual inability and resisting generalizations).
16 See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1168-70.
"6 See Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 661 F.2d at 307.
16 See Player, supra note 11, at 766.
"e See text accompanying notes 36-57 supra (Hodgson test).
' See text accompanying notes 74-87 supra (Tamiami test).
169 See text accompanying notes 187-93 infra (discussing basis of safety and age discrim-
ination dilemma); notes 36-105 supra (BFOQ conflict among circuits).
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right of the public to expect adequate precautionary hiring measures in
businesses involving some safety risk to the public.' ° Policymakers have
not yet pronounced a position on the conflict between public safety and
the employment of allegedly less competent workers, whether older,
handicapped, or otherwise.'' Until Congress decides that safety is
superior to the interest of such workers, or that it must balance the two
interests, or that public safety inherently is of lessor importance than
the rights of workers, any BFOQ test will remain a mere placebo for a
very complex societal ill.'"'
The core of the age/safety dilemma will become apparent only after
policymakers have reached decisions on two preliminary levels.' First,
Congress needs to decide if an employer's invocation of "public safety"
alone is sufficient to support an age BFOQ. 7 Congress could conclude
that safety is absolutely paramount and that government interference
with employer discretion in age-related hiring practices is improper.'
The current political trend which favors the reduction of government in-
fluence in private business lends itself to a legislativb acquiescence in
employer discretion in regard to employment practices.' Legislative ac-
quiescence in employer discretion in the hiring of older workers prob-
ably in turn would gain support from the current tendency toward
judicial restraint in the private business sector.'77 In the event of Con-
gress' acceptance of complete employer judgment about safety and the
older worker, the courts could stop at this first level of inquiry and could
fashion a BFOQ standard which incorporates this safety/employer dis-
cretion bias. 8
" See James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 11; The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at
1173. See generally Balancing the Interest; supra note 2.
"I The ADEA does not mention the effect of public safety on the issue of employment
of older workers. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970). The Department of Labor bulletin construing
the BFOQ provision did mention that a BFOQ must be imposed for the safety and conveni-
ence of the public to be valid. 29 C.F.R. §§ 806.102(d)(e) (1980). The EEOC has deleted this
requirment from its bulletin, leaving the effect of safety on the BFOQ determination
unclear. See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1149 n. 25.
'' See text accompanying notes 185-91 infra (judicial need for congressional
guidelines).
' See text accompanying notes 174-83 infra.
' See Player, supra note 11, at 754-65; James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 1-6; Balancing
the Interest supra note 2, at 1354-57. Congress should not allow an employer's mere asser-
tion of public safety to block an examination of the employer's hiring practices. See text ac-
companying notes 120-32 supra. But see 667 F.2d at 101 (court should not interfere with
employer discretion when public safety is involved).
Cf. 667 F.2d 100-01 (judicial determination that safety is superior to rights of older
workers).
"' See McGowan, Regulatory Analysis and Judicial Review, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 627, 630
(1981).
See Smith, Urging Judicial Restraint, 68 A.B.A.J. 59, 60 (1982).
" See 667 F.2d at 101 (court adopts BFOQ test which favors safety and employer dis-
cretion).
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If Congress rejects safety as an absolute justification for unfettered
employer discretion, however, it must consider the second preliminary
level of inquiry in the age discrimination dilemma. In the second level,
Congress must decide if public safety is an interest subject to classifica-
tion into measurable degrees of risk to the public, and thus measurable
degrees of necessary protection.'79 The fundamental nature of public
safety as a governmental responsibility makes careful, empirical
analysis of the degree of risk to the public from hiring older workers in
certain jobs essential even if difficult."80 All jobs within the public trans-
portation industry, for example, do not involve the same degree of risk
to the public, even though most involve some responsibility for large
numbers of people. A test pilot's job would seem to involve a less direct
risk to the public than does a commercial pilot's job because the test
pilot carries no passengers."' A bus driver's job, on the other hand, may
involve a greater degree of risk to the public than a commercial pilot's
job because a bus driver generally has no extra driver to replace him if
he becomes ill."8' By looking beyond safety as an absolute and by analyz-
ing variables such as emergency replacements, medical capability of the
employee to perform his job, and the number of people at risk in various
occupations, Congress should be able to differentiate among degrees of
risk to the public if employers hire older workers in certain
occupations. 8 ' In some cases, the policymakers could discover that,
although public safety is an integral part of a business, the hiring of
older workers may not prove detrimental and perhaps could decrease
the risk to the public. 8 4
In those cases in which the second level of inquiry leads to a finding
that the hiring of older workers might have some adverse effect on
public safety, Congress finally must face the crux of the age discrimina-
tion/safety dispute. Congress must determine if, and to what extent,
society is willing to balance risk to public safety against the rights of
older workers. 8' Activities such as mass public transportation always
179 See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1166-70 (discussing degrees of risk to
public involved in various jobs within police department). The Janesville court suggested
that degree of risk should not be a consideration when public safety occupations are at
issue. 630 F.2d at 1256. The Hodgson court, on the other hand, did discuss the difference in
risks to the public between various jobs in the airline industry. 553 F.2d at 564.
"' See The Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 22, at 1170-75 (courts should consider empir-
ical evidence of effect of hiring older workers on safety rather than relying on employer's
good faith judgment).
See Age Discrimination and Test Pilots, supra note 90, at 196.
19 See 531 F.2d at 231.
' See Balancing the Interest, supra note 2, at 1361-64. A body with extensive fact-
finding capabilities should make the determination of the effect of hiring older workers of
safety in particular occupations rather than the courts. Id. at 1361.
18 See 553 F.2d at 563-64 (airplane accidents decrease as pilot's age increases).
" See James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 10-11; Balancing the Interest, supra note 2, at
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have involved a certain degree of risk to the public.'86 Phrased starkly,
the unappealing issue Congress must wrestle with is whether society is
willing to increase that inherent risk even minutely to secure employ-
ment and financial well-being for the older worker in safety-related busi-
nesses.187 Admittedly, Congress will face sensitive and often intangible
moral, political, and economic considerations in its efforts to balance the
rights of the public and the older worker.188 The legislature's failure to
deal with the ultimate political balancing, however, will lead only to a
continuation of the judicial confusion over the BFOQ issue."8 9 The
absence of clear legislative guidance about the weight to be given safety
and the rights of older workers in particular occupations has forced
courts to rely on incomplete and biased empirical data offered by oppos-
ing parties and on their own individual instincts, prejudices, and morals
in reaching decisions on the balancing of the rights of employers,
workers, and the public. 9 ' As a result, the circuit courts have placed
varying values on the respective interests of safety, employer judgment,
and older workers,' and have created an ambiguous, inconsistent
morass of tests which give little assistance to workers and employers
who wish to avoid BFOQ age conflicts.
Since the age discrimination dilemma is so complex and politically
sensitive, Congress probably will require much time to formulate ra-
tional guidelines for courts and employers to follow. In the meantime,
employers can take some practical steps gleaned from current BFOQ
case law to ameliorate the tension between safety and older workers.'9'
The airline industry, which is currently at the center of the BFOQ con-
flict, 93 probably could reduce the amount of its litigation by following a
few steps. First, the airlines should not immediately disqualify ap-
plicants over the age of thirty, as they do today.'94 Instead, the airline
should set up a complete set of individualized tests for the symptoms
that normally accompany aging and for undetected diseases that could
affect public safety.' In fact, the airlines should examine the pilots even
"' See James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 9.
See 499 F.2d 859 (employer need only show that elimination of its hiring policy
would jeopardize the life of one person for court to uphold BFOQ).
'u See Balancing the Interest, supra note 2, at 1361.
"' See text accompanying notes 36-105 supra (conflicts among BFOQ cases).
See Balancing the Interest, supra note 2, at 1361-62.
... See 667 F.2d at 101 (emphasis on employer discretion); 553 F.2d at 195-96 (emphasis
on worker); 499 F.2d at 862-63 (prime emphasis on public safety).
"' See text accompanying notes 193-99 infra.
'9' See Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981); Murnane v.
American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977).
" See Rosenblum, supra note 19, at 1272 n. 67.
", See Balancing the Interest, supra note 2, at 1356. Individualized tests, if feasible,
should operate to produce a very healthy, able group of older workers with little risk of un-
detected medical problems. See note 136 supra. Because of conflict within the medical corn-
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more thoroughly than the FAA's requirement of a six month general
screening. '96 The airlines also should consider transferring flying ex-
perience credit from other airlines or the armed forces in order to
shorten training periods or. promotion periods for experienced pilots.19 '
Most airlines currently do not consider prior flight experience in their
age-related employment decisions. '98 Finally, if an airline truly feels that
the hiring of older pilots will endanger the safety of its passengers, it
should gather as much empirical data as possible to support its conclu-
sions before denying the position to an older worker. '99
munity about the nature of the physical changes necessarily correlative with aging, and
about the degree to which testing can discover these deficiencies, however, the concern in
regard to hiring older workers in some fields may be justified. See Interview with Dr.
William Hark, Chief of the Aero Medical Standards Division of the Office of Aviation
Medicine, Federal Aviation Agency (March 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hark Interview].
An intense debate concerning whether physical deterioration is caused by the aging process
itself or by other external factors currently is being waged within the medical community.
Id. The medical community also is divided over whether individual testing can accurately
predict the chances of an individual being disabled by an undetected disease. Id One com-
mentator has suggested that doctors can predict the risk of suffering a heart attack or
stroke from undetected heart disease with a great amount of accuracy. Rosenblum, supra
note 19, at 1272; 553 F.2d at 564 (heart disease in pilots can be detected with almost
foolproof accuracy); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 27 FEP Cases 904, 908 (C.D. Calif.
1981) (inexpensive tests like EKG and Bruce Protocol test can predict with 99% certainty
the chances of future heart attacks over the short-term). Dr. Hark disagrees that medical
testing has reached a point of virtual accuracy in predicting undetected diseases. Hark In-
terview, supra. He also stated that as age increases, the more complex the necessary
medical tests become to detect future disabling deficiencies in pilots. Id As, the tests
become more complex, so does the cost of the tests. Id. As medical technology advances,
however, more efficient, accurate, and inexpensive methods of testing the symptoms accom-
panying aging are coming into use. See Rosenblum, supra note 19, at 1272 (advances in
testing pilots). Twenty years ago, the FAA found individual testing impractical for commer-
cial pilots. Id. However, tests are in existence now that can measure the effects of aging on
piolts. Id.; see Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 667 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981). United Air
Lines subjects all pilots to periodic tests such as blood screening, electrocardiograms,
urinalysis, x-rays and diabetes screening. Id.
If medical science in a certain field has progressed to the point where accurate and effi-
cient individual testing is available, the factors of maturity, experience, and judgment that
older workers can bring to their jobs make it impractical and even unsafe not to hire the
older worker. See 553 F.2d at 563. The accident rate of pilots decreases with age. Id. A major
cause of airplane accidents is poor pilot judgment, which is cause by lack of experience. Id.
at 563-64. All of the airline crashes reported by the defendant in the Hodgsgn case involved
young pilots in their thirties, not older, more experienced pilots. Id.
19 Hark Interview, supra note 195. The FAA requires all pilots to undergo a general
medical screening every six months. Id The tests are not exhaustive, and some airlines add
supplemental tests to the FAA testing. Id.
1" See Rosenblum, supra note 19, at 1273. Some airlines do not allow pilots to transfer
flying experience credits from other airlines or the armed forces. Id The idea of nontrans-
ferability of skills can exclude many older pilots from employment because their promotion
periods will not be shortened by the previous experience. Id Thus, many older pilots, if
hired, would reach age 60 and have to retire before they completed the training program.
Id. Airlines will not hire pilots they do not expect to finish the training program. See id.
198 Id.
199 See Player, supra note 11, at 766-67; The Age Discrimination, supra note 4, at 384.
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The present law of age BFOQs is in serious conflict among the cir-
cuits that have heard BFOQ cases."' None of the proffered tests ade-
quately protect the aging worker or fully promote the policies behind
the ADEA, although the Tamiami progeny is coming closer to ap-
proaching the ADEA goals. 0' The courts have failed to consider in depth
the issue of public safety versus the needs of the older worker.' In par-
ticular the courts have ignored the possible contribution to safety that
older, more experienced workers can bring to the job market."' The
tests have given employers far too much discretion in the name of public
safety, and have neglected to put in the forefront the necessity for in-
dividualized testing."4 Congress needs to create a new test that will
focus on areas ignored or undermined by the courts, such as matching
the individual to specific duties rather than to the overall nature of the
business."' Congress should wipe the age BFOQ slate clean of Title VII
tests that have been misinterpreted and distorted,"8 and should fashion
special tests particularly suited to the problem of aging. The BFOQ
represents a potentially dangerous threat to workers, since the BFOQ
rests on a generalization about age, usually considered an anathema to
discrimination issues."°' Only by narrowing considerably the availability
of the BFOQ exception to employers, even in the areas involving some
degree of public safety, will the interests of the aging worker be
represented under the ADEA."'
DEBORAH HUTCHINS COMBS
See text accompanying note 25 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra.
See generally Balancing the Interes4-supra note 2.
See text accompanying notes 135-36 supra.
See text accompanying notes 108-56 supra.
See text accompanying notes 157-66 supra.
See James & Alaimo, supra note 2, at 11.
" See text accompanying note 22 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 157-66 supra.
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